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 Fundamental Fields of
Post-Schumpeterian Evolutionary Economics
Esben Sloth Andersen
The label evolutionary economics has been used to denote several strands of
modern research. One of the strands of evolutionary economies tries to explain
the preferences of economic agents in relation to the deep evolutionary his-
tory of Homo sapiens. This strand, which may be called behavioural evolution-
ary economics, can to some extent be characterised by its combination of the
tools of game theory with those of experimental economics. Another strand
of evolutionary economics studies the behaviour of ﬁrms in terms of routine
and innovation in order to understand the evolution of the economic system
that takes place during decades or centuries. This second strand is not least
characterised by frequent references to Schumpeter’s pioneering work on the
role of entrepreneurship and credit in the capitalist engine of economic trans-
formation. Therefore, it might be called neo-Schumpeterian evolutionary eco-
nomics or, more cautiously, post-Schumpeterian evolutionary economics. Al-
though there are many potential connections between the behavioural and the
post-Schumpeterian strand of evolutionary economics, they have hitherto de-
veloped separately. Since this separation can hardly be overcome quickly, dis-
cussions on the further development of evolutionary economics have to take
their starting point in one of the strands. The present paper focusses in the
post-Schumpeterian strand. From this perspective, it is obvious to relate to
Schumpeter in order to discuss the possibilities of establishing evolutionary
economics as an important part of the science of economics.
The scale and scope of Schumpeter’s work as well as the unﬁnished na-
ture of his evolutionary economics serve to emphasise that it is impossible
to re-establish “Schumpeter’s evolutionary economics” (Andersen, forthcom-
ing). It seems more appropriate to say that evolutionary economics has moved
beyond Schumpeter’s strand of evolutionary economics. We should add two
facts. First, evolutionary economics has also moved beyond Marshall and Ve-
blen and many other pioneers. Second, evolutionary economics has more for-
mally moved beyond classical game theory and the mathematical theory of
linear systems. These facts help to explain the complexity of the present-day
situation for evolutionary economics. Nevertheless, Schumpeter might help
us to clarify important aspects of the situation. One of his ideas was to think
in terms of the fundamental ﬁelds of the science of economics. In the present
paper, this idea of fundamental ﬁelds is used to characterise the situation of
modern evolutionary economics.
While Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy is Schumpeter’s most cited book
and The Theory of Economic Development is normally considered his magnum
opus, his scientiﬁc ambitions are better reﬂected in the largely ignored Business
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Cycles. Actually, Schumpeter summarised his research programme in the sub-
title of this book: A Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist
Process. The “capitalist process” is the process of economic evolution in capital-
ist societies; and Schumpeter’s ambition was to make “a theoretical, historical,
and statistical analysis” of this evolutionary process. Even a quick inspection
of Business Cycles demonstrates that Schumpeter made his book appear uncon-
vincing by presenting it as giving a general explanation of business cycles. In
practice, however, he put the emphasis on irregular waves of economic evo-
lution and the related macroeconomic phenomena. This emphasis could have
been reﬂected in the title of the book. He could thus have called it ‘Innovation-
induced Business Cycles’, ‘Evolutionary Business Cycles’, or ‘The Waves of
Capitalist Economic Evolution’. By adding the main point of the subtitle, he
could have arrived at a title like ‘Theory, History, and Statistics of the Waves of
Capitalist Economic Evolution’. The book’s main message is that we have to
combine theory and fact in the analysis of economic evolution.
1. Combining history, statistics, and theory
Schumpeter presented his idea of the fundamental ﬁelds of the science of eco-
nomics in History of Economic Analysis. By moving from the personal research
agenda of Business Cycles to the development of economics as a whole he
dramatised the problem of combining theory with history and statistics. It be-
comes clear that we are facing three scientiﬁc specialities that cannot be com-
bined easily. Schumpeter (1954, 10) thus emphasised that the “process of spe-
cialization has never gone on according to any rational plan—whether explic-
itly preconceived or only objectively present”. Therefore, “science as a whole
has never attained a logically consistent architecture; it is a tropical forest, not
a building erected according to blueprint.” This statement also covers the divi-
sion of labour that has emerged within the science of economics. History of
Economic Analysis presents the structure of this division of labour in the in-
troductory chapter on “The Techniques of Economic Analysis”. This chapter
includes a short description of the bewildering set of “applied ﬁelds” of eco-
nomics. However, its main concern is the “fundamental ﬁelds” of economic
analysis (pp. 12–21). He emphasised that “[w]hat distinguishes the ‘scientiﬁc’
economist from all the other people who think, talk, and write about economic
topics is a command of techniques that we class under three headings: history,
statistics, and ‘theory’” (p. 12). Later in the chapter, he added “a fourth funda-
mental ﬁeld to complement the three others, ... economic sociology” (p. 21).
Schumpeter was convinced that major scientiﬁc breakthroughs emerged
from new ways of seeing economic phenomena. The ultimate implementation
of such visions requires the use and renewal of economic theory; but it also
suggests the use and renewal of economic history, statistics, and economic so-
ciology. An ambitious theorist needs to build his work on a vision that focus
on novel aspects of economic phenomena. These aspects are novel in the sense
that they are not adequately covered by existing economic theory. This is the
starting point for a personal research programme that begins from the exist-

















Figure 1: Schumpeter’s scheme of the scientiﬁc process
From the viewpoint of the economic theorist, the innovative activity primarily
concerns concepts and mathematical tools (see Figure 1). However, scientiﬁc
theories have in some way or another to be related to data, and these data are
not necessarily available. In the attempt to provide them, or to persuade other
researchers to do the job, the theorist may become aware of the need of innovat-
ing existing methods for providing historical or statistical data. Furthermore,
he might need to develop the implications of the vision and the theory for eco-
nomic sociology.
The discussion presupposes a deﬁnition of the concept of theory. Schum-
peter (1954, 15) suggested that “economic theory is a box of tools”. It should
be noted that he thought in terms of scientiﬁc toolboxes that are to some ex-
tent highly structured: “Economic theory ... cannot indeed, any more than
can theoretical physics, do without simplifying schemata or models that are in-
tended to portray certain aspects of reality and take some things for granted in
order to establish others according to certain rules of procedure”. To be more
speciﬁc, “the things (propositions) that we take for granted may be called indis-
criminately either hypotheses or axioms or postulates or assumptions or even
principles, and the things (propositions) that we think we have established by
admissible procedure are called theorems.” Although the hypotheses we take
forgrantedarenormallysuggestedbyfacts, theyareinstrictlogic“mereinstru-
ments or tools framed for the purpose of establishing interesting results” (p. 15).
It is in this sense that he thought of economic theory and not in the sense of
creating an unstructured collection of concrete explanatory hypotheses that are
“essential ingredients of historiography and statistics also” (p. 14).
As long as we emphasise the viewpoint of an individual economic theo-
rist, the ambition to innovate the existing statistical and historical methods
is an auxiliary one. However, the priorities are different if we consider the
genesis of scientiﬁc contributions from the viewpoints of statistical or histori-
cal researchers. For instance, both Gustav von Schmoller and Wesley Mitchell
wanted to recreate the science of economics by promoting the production of
huge amounts of novel data; and these efforts were presumably guided by per-
sonal visions. As demonstrated by the battle of methods between the history-1. Combining history, statistics, and theory 4
oriented Schmoller and the theory-oriented Menger, they both wanted their
own ﬁeld to be the one that deﬁned the science of economics and that deter-
mined the conditions for the development of the other ﬁeld. Schumpeter (1954,
814) emphasised that they “not only created a lot of bad feeling but also set
running a stream of literature, both of which took decades to subside”. This “is
substantially a history of wasted energies, which could have been put to better
use.” The alternative was to develop an understanding of the actual existence
of mutual interdependence. He summarised his ideas by comparing scientiﬁc
economics with “a big omnibus which contains many passengers of incom-
mensurable interests and abilities” (p. 827). These “passengers” make contri-
butions that are “incommensurable”, that is, were lacking a common quality on
which to make a comparison. Nevertheless, Schumpeter wanted to appreciate
not only Léon Walras’s abstract model of general equilibrium as the greatest
contribution to pure theory (p. 827). He also characterised the “rather pedes-
trian” work of Schmoller as representing “a tremendous advance in accuracy of
knowledge about the social process” (p. 810). More generally, he thought that
the contributions of both neoclassical economics (economic theory) and the his-
torical school (history, statistics, and economic sociology) had been crucial for
the evolution of economics. Therefore, it was important for Schumpeter to be-
gin his History of Economic Analysis with a discussion of the apparently incom-
patible but actually fundamental ﬁelds of economic analysis: history, statistics,
theory, and economic sociology.
Schumpeter’s emphasis on the statistical and historical tools of economic
analysis had a polemical twist. His studies of the long-term evolution of eco-
nomics seem to demonstrate that economic theory is the main driver of this
evolution; but he also emphasised that this dominance can be detrimental for
scientiﬁc advance. This is clearly the reason for the sequential ordering of his
“three headings: history, statistics, and ‘theory’” (Schumpeter, 1954, 12). He
put theory after history and statistics in his short list of “fundamental ﬁelds”
because he wanted to emphasise the ﬁrst item. Although he suggested that a
graduate student needed “a tolerably good undergraduate training in history
or mathematics” to become “an all-round economist” (p. 14n), history was his
main concern. Schumpeter pointed out that his “American students ... lack
the historical sense that no amount of factual study can give. This is why it
is so much easier to make theorists of them than economists” (p. 472n). He in-
cluded “economic sociology” as “a fourth fundamental ﬁeld” of economic anal-
ysis (p. 21). This ﬁeld provides systematic analyses of “the facts of economic
behavior” and “the institutions that characterize the economic organisation of
the societies to be studied” (p. 544). Although economic theorists often did not
bother to analyse these frameworks, Schumpeter had come to the conclusion
that this task is essential. The institutional frameworks of the models introduce
“social facts that are not simply economic history but are a sort of generalized
or typiﬁed or stylized economic history” (p. 20).
History of Economic Analysis does not explicitly confront the evolutionary
economics that Schumpeter had tried to develop. Nevertheless, the book’s
theory of scientiﬁc evolution seems appropriate for analysing his failure of es-
tablishing this branch of the science of economics. The main explanation for
the lack of success at the level of the scientiﬁc community is that Schumpe-2. Starting from evolutionary economic history 5
ter did not succeed in ﬁnding or producing sufﬁciently operational techniques
for analysing economic evolution. This failure is not only a theoretical one.
Since economic evolution is a unique process in historical time, the theoreti-
cal concepts of evolutionary economics have to be closely related to historical
and statistical analysis. Furthermore, the long-term evolution of the system of
economic routines is heavily inﬂuenced by the parallel evolutionary processes
within other sectors of social life. The consequence is that evolutionary eco-
nomics has to include evolutionary economic sociology in order to deﬁne its
borderline with, and its relation to the evolution of other sectors of social life.
The overall conclusion is that the development of all Schumpeter’s four funda-
mental ﬁelds is crucial for the establishing evolutionary economics as a branch
of economics.
The present paper is largely limited to cover only three of the fundamen-
tal ﬁelds of evolutionary economics. The discussion concerns theory, statistics,
and history—and their interconnections (see Figure 2). Since basic evolutionary
economic theory plays a predominant role, the reader might get the impression
that this ﬁeld of evolutionary economics is more fundamental than the other
fundamental ﬁelds. However, this misuse of the term ‘fundamental’ is not sug-
gested: all three ﬁelds are fundamental in the sense of being necessary and
relatively independent elements of evolutionary economics. Ideally, “they are
inseparable because there is an incessant give and take between them” (Schum-
peter, 1949, 329). The alliance between theory and statistics not only helps to
produce evolutionarily relevant statistics; it also promotes the operationalisa-
tion of theoretical concepts and enforces the development of new theoretical
tools. The alliance between theory and history can confront economic evolu-
tion as a complex historical process and study the degree to which it can be
decomposed adequately. We should also add the alliances between evolution-
ary theory and the many ﬁelds of applied evolutionary economics. Take, for
instance, evolutionary organisation studies. This ﬁeld has not only applied
given theoretical schemes but also developed analytical tools that are impor-
tant for basic evolutionary theorising. Nevertheless, the development of basic
evolutionary theory is crucial because it helps to coordinate the research efforts
conceptually. Another type of coordination might be provided by the different
evolutionary economic visions—of which the vision underlying Schumpeter’s
work is a conspicuous one. Since extra-scientiﬁc visions seem to provide guid-
ance not only for personal work but also for the work of groups of researchers,
these visions have to be made explicit. The study of the visions may also help
to reveal and, perhaps, correct the resulting biases.
2. Starting from evolutionary economic history
Schumpeterian evolutionary economic theory can be regarded as a theory of
economic history. Schumpeter’s (1942, 83n) “process of industrial mutation”
includes “revolutions” that “occur in discrete rushes which are separated from
each other by spans of comparative quiet”; this means that there “always is
either revolution or absorption of the results of revolution”. His formulations
















Figure 2: The four fundamental ﬁelds of evolutionary economics
ination and emotions of both economic actors and researchers deeply.
Schumpeter expressed his vision of the dramatic evolutionary process by
means of a basic analytical model (or “scheme”) that apparently tamed the
drama. However, the drama is just below the surface of the scheme. Actu-
ally, several of his contemporaries suggested that Schumpeter had constructed
a semi-formalised epic of a sequence of heroes whose innovations transform a
society that otherwise tends to produce dull routine. Nevertheless, the semi-
formalised scheme helped him to develop speciﬁc theories and models, and
they in turn helped him to organise the complex facts of economic evolution. To
function in this way, his basic scheme and his concrete models needed to make
assumptions that were not part of the vision. More speciﬁcally, the purpose of
Schumpeter’s assumptions was to allow an untraditional form of equilibrium
analysis. His concept of equilibrium implies that the evolutionary process has
come to a temporary halt, and this concept allowed him to study evolution in
well-deﬁned steps.
In the simplest case, the innovative activities emerge from a routine system
characterised by this type equilibrium, and after the implementation of the in-
novations, a new equilibrated routine system emerges. Let us consider the case
of long-term economic evolution for which we can describe Schumpeter’s basic
analytical scheme in the following way:
• Initial equilibrium: We start from an economic system in which evolution
has come to a halt so that it is based on solid routine behaviour. This
system is assumed to have found an equilibrium (the Σ0 state) that allows
the economic agents year after year to operate in their accustomed ways.
• Economicinnovation: Theinitialequilibriumbreaksdownwhenaminor-
ity of innovators challenges some of the routines (the δ1 mechanism). Un-
der capitalist conditions, a strong credit system helps these innovators—
the Schumpeterian entrepreneurs who establish new ﬁrms. By means of
credit, they bring the system to a maximally disequilibrated state (the ∆1
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• Creative destruction and the movement towards equilibrium: After a
competitive struggle between agents related to old and new routines (the
σ1 mechanism), a renewed and well-established routine system emerges
(the Σ1 state).
• Long-tern economic evolution: The renewed equilibrium forms the basis
for another phase of disturbing innovative activity (the δ2 mechanism).
The long-term economic evolution of the routine system consists in a se-
ries of routinised equilibria (Σ0,Σ1,Σ2,...) and the subsequent innovative
rebellions against these equilibria (δ1,δ2,δ3,...).
This scheme of punctuated equilibria cannot be interpreted as reﬂecting a
form of developmentalism in Schumpeter’s thinking. The reason is that he did
not assume that the renewed equilibrium was the deterministic result of the
initial equilibrium, not even if we knew the innovation that disturbed it. The
scheme is rather reﬂecting a strategy for analysing the immensely complex pro-
cess of economic evolution. This strategy might appear as an extended form of
comparative-static analysis, but we should not overlook that Schumpeter is ap-
plying a very untraditional concept of equilibrium for his theory of wave-form
economic evolution. The initial equilibrium has not come about by the deliber-
ations of actors with perfect foresight and ﬂexible behaviour. Instead, it is the
outcome of a process of bankruptcy, job destruction, and stressful learning.
Schumpeter’s ambition in Business Cycles was to provide some sort of ver-
iﬁcation of his basic scheme of economic evolution by demonstrating that it
can be used for developing an analysis of the history of waveform economic
evolution. This ambition is reﬂected in the structure of the book. The theoret-
ical part provides the approximations needed for handling economic history
and the statistical part serves to decompose this history. Then the task of the
historical part is to demonstrate the actual working of the mechanisms of the
capitalist engine. This type of history represented the “Historical Approach
to the Problems of the Cyclical Process of Evolution”; and the “importance of
such an approach has to be emphasized from the outset” (Schumpeter, 1939,
220). Actually, he thought that “nothing can be more plain or even more trite
common sense than the proposition that innovation, as conceived by us, is at
the center of practically all the phenomena, difﬁculties, and problems of eco-
nomic life in capitalist society” (p. 87). This is a provocative statement. On
the one hand, Schumpeter made the radical proposition that his interpretation
of innovation explains “practically all” interesting features of capitalism. On
the other hand, he claimed that this proposition is “trite common sense”. One
might argue ironically that “nothing” is less plain for most economists than this
claim. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Schumpeter had come to think in
this way and that he wanted his readers to do the same before they worked
their way through his successive approximations to a model of the innovation-
based capitalist evolution. He realised in advance how “difﬁcult it may turn
out to be to develop that simple idea so far as to ﬁt it for the task of coping
with all the complex patterns with which it will have to be confronted” (p. 87).
He also realised how “completely it may lose its simplicity on the way before
us”. Nevertheless, he emphasised that “it should never be forgotten that at the
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Figure 3: Stylised economic evolution with innovation and adaptation
Schumpeter’s (1939, 303–97) favourite way of looking around was to study
the history of “The bourgeois Kondratieff”. Since the basic innovations that
carried this Kondratieff wave were related to the railways, he also called it the
age of “the railroadization of the world” or, somewhat broader, the age of “rail-
roads, steel, and steam”. However, Schumpeter primarily named it “the bour-
geois Kondratieff”. Thereby, he emphasised that it was the period in which
not only the economic system but also social life in general was dominated by
competitive capitalism. In this context, his theory could most directly be used
to analyse the historical process of economic evolution. Actually, he stated that
“railroadization is our standard example by which to illustrate the working of
our model” (p. 304). In this example, many factors “combine to make the es-
sential features of our evolutionary process more obvious in this than they are
in any other case. More easily than in any other can the usual objections to
our analysis be silenced by a simple reference to obvious facts.” Although he
applied a complex analytical apparatus to analyse the example, his basic idea
can be phrased within his abstract scheme of evolution. The mechanism of in-
novation (the δ mechanism) covers the movement from one circular ﬂow to the
maximally disequilibrated state of the economic system while the mechanism
of adaptation (the σ mechanism) covers the movement back to another circular
ﬂow. The sequential working of these mechanisms can easily be related to a
stylised version of the process of railroadization (see Figure 3):
• The process of railroadization started from an equilibrated system of eco-
nomic routine, including the routines underlying mail-coach-based ser-
vices for long-distance transportation (the Σ0 state).
• Then the economic system became disturbed by the introduction of
railway-based transport services with a large potential and with large re-
source needs.
• A major reorganisation of the system of economic routine took place
through several cycles of economic prosperity and recession. The end
result was a relatively equilibrated state, partly based on the routines of
railway transportation (the Σ1 state).
• Then this system was disturbed by the addition of lorries for transport
over long distances. Thereby, a new round of the story began.
Although this sequence of events does emphasise the some characteristics
of the age of “the railroadization of the world”, Schumpeter did not want to2. Starting from evolutionary economic history 9
reduce his contribution to a highly stylised characterisation of Kondratieff up-
swings (based on the δ mechanism) and Kondratieff downswings (based on
the σ mechanism). He recognised that the fruitful interaction between theoret-
ical analysis and historical analysis is more likely to take place in connection to
very detailed studies of the processes of evolution. This strategy became espe-
cially clear when Schumpeter, near the end of his life, presented a paper at a
business-cycle conference. At this conference, Schumpeter addressed many of
the most talented theorists, statisticians, and model builders. He was known
to all of them as one of the founding members and past president of the presti-
gious Econometric Society. Therefore, the audience was greatly surprised when
he presented a paper on “The Historical Approach to the Analysis of Business
Cycles”. This paper questioned the role of econometrics and mathematical eco-
nomics as the all-dominant forms of the progress of modern economics. For
Schumpeter (1949, 329), “the most serious shortcoming of modern business-
cycle studies is that nobody seems to understand or even to care precisely how
industries and individual ﬁrms raise and fall and how their raise and fall affects
the aggregates”. Therefore, he suggested that “what is really required is a large
collection of industrial and locational monographs all drawn up according to
the same plan and giving proper attention on the one hand to the incessant
change in production and consumption functions and on the other hand to the
quality and behavior of the leading personnel” (p. 328).
The purpose of Schumpeter’s (1949, 325) apparently idiosyncratic proposal
of “detailed historical case studies” was obviously to elucidate the evolution-
ary mechanisms underlying much of the cyclical behaviour of economic aggre-
gates. Schumpeter thought that even the cyclical behaviour of investment is in
itself a surface phenomenon and that we have to investigate “the actual indus-
trial process that produces it and in doing so revolutionize existing economic
structures” (p. 326; emphasis removed). He must have recognised that the sug-
gested collection of case studies of the evolutionary change of selected indus-
tries and regions would hardly give any direct input to the study of business
cycles. However, thesuggestedmonographswouldprovideinformationonthe
evolutionary mechanisms of innovation and adaptation; and this information
could in turn provide the stylised facts for theoretical modelling and economet-
ric studies. Although Schumpeter did not give these intermediate arguments
in the unrevised paper, he did state the conclusion: “Theoretical and statistical
work is as necessary as is the historical work. In fact they are inseparable be-
cause there is an incessant give and take between them” (p. 329). He wanted to
“indicate how theory and statistics ﬁt in with the historical approach” (p. 322).
This would be a ﬁrst step in creating an alliance that combined all the three
fundamental ﬁelds of research in order to understand capitalist economic evo-
lution.
In the 1940s, Schumpeter found historians who apparently were willing
to apply his evolutionary concepts. They were led by the economic historian
Arthur Cole, who was engaged in organising historical studies of entrepreneur-
ship. The result was the establishment of the Harvard Research Center in En-
trepreneurial History, which functioned under Cole’s leadership from 1948 to
1958. Schumpeter provided crucial support for Cole’s project; and he became a
member of the centre who, in several papers, emphasised the theoretical under-2. Starting from evolutionary economic history 10
pinnings of the research. However, the major help Schumpeter could have got
from the research of the many economic historians that worked with his con-
cept on entrepreneurship at the Harvard research centre and elsewhere is rather
limited. The help might be summarised as a pressure for developing a more op-
erational concept. This pressure was later formulated by Peter Kilby (1971) by
his comparison of the problem of ﬁnding real entrepreneurs with the problem
of“huntingtheHeffalump”. ReadersofthechildrenbooksonWinnie-the-Pooh
will know that the Heffalump is a strange animal that is never seen and so ill-
deﬁned that it could hardly have been recognised. Similar pressures for spec-
iﬁcation emerged from studies of the history of individual industries and the
waveform evolution of whole economies. However, the difﬁculties were not
really overcome even after Schumpeter’s death. Actually, it was not least the
vagueness of Schumpeter-inspired studies of economic history of, for instance,
railroadization that helped to set the stage for the “new economic history” of
researchers like Robert Fogel. By applying some of the tools of equilibrium
economics, new economic history provided more limited but also more precise
analyses of phenomena like the effects of the railway innovation than those
who had been working along Schumpeterian lines (O’Brien, 1977). Although
Fogel’s analysis gives very little help for the development of a precise analy-
sis of the process of economic evolution, it serves a useful warning against the
too-easy acceptance of, for instance, the railway innovation as the major cause
of the Kondratieff wave of the nineteenth century.
From the viewpoint of evolutionary economics, a “research center in en-
trepreneurial history” is problematic because entrepreneurship can only be de-
ﬁned adequately in the context of the mechanisms of economic evolution. The
entrepreneur becomes an undeﬁned Heffalump when studied in isolation from
this context. Schumpeter’s contributions to the Harvard Research Center in En-
trepreneurial History seem to have made this point clear. However, the point
can also be derived from his proposal of a coordinated collection of industrial
and locational monographs. Schumpeter died before he could develop a plan
that emphasised innovation and the role of leaders. However, even his sketchy
remarks demonstrate that he was not trying to gain support for isolated stud-
ies on entrepreneurial history. Instead, he seems to have promoted a research
effort that could have been called a research centre for the historical study of
the mechanisms of economic evolution. In this respect, the proposal is rather
related to Business Cycles. In this book, he had performed a wide-ranging his-
torical study in order to come to grips with his proposition that business cy-
cles reﬂect long-term economic evolution within the capitalist system. He had
been especially happy with his results on the standard example of railroad-
ization. However, he wanted to move from macroscopic historical studies to
detailed monographic work on the mechanisms of economic evolution. This
seems to be the major background for his idea of coordinated industrial and
locational monographs. The proposed large collection of monographs could
have started with a subset of books that explores important details of the age
of railway construction—both in its pioneering and its more mature stages.
The pioneering period was the time when the horse-driven mail coaches were
out-competed, schemes for ﬁnancing railway projects blossomed and failed,
industries supplying and using the railways were set up, railway towns mush-2. Starting from evolutionary economic history 11
roomed, and so on. The period of maturation was not least characterised by
the routinisation of what earlier had been novelties. The maturation period
also included the emergence of early forms of the modern corporation, partly
as the forced outcome of ﬁnancial crises and conspicuous examples of creative
destruction.
By emphasising case studies of industries and locations rather than indi-
vidual entrepreneurship, Schumpeter’s suggested that he wanted to combine
the creative side and the destructive side of his “process of creative destruc-
tion”. These investigations can hardly avoid combining the economic pro-
cess of creative destruction with socio-political change. Actually, each of the
early railways in the United Kingdom needed to be accepted by the Parlia-
ment. There was also, here and elsewhere, political lobbying against concrete
railways, movements for protection against increased imports due to the rail-
ways, and attempts to organise labour to delimit the social consequences. By
confronting this type of issue, the historical studies serve to solve problems
that are often ignored by specialised theorists. The economic historian Dou-
glas North (1998, 23) wanted, in this own terms, to confront questions “akin to
those that Schumpeter raised in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. He did so
by comparing the long-term growth of “the costs of transacting” with the “pro-
ductivity gains from improvements arising from the increments to the stock of
knowledge”. Since transactions costs to some extent reﬂect the strength of the
reactions against the social consequences of the capitalist engine, the outcome
is uncertain. Christopher Freeman (2007, 139) seems to have been closer to the
perspectives of evolutionary economic history when he recently discussed the
idea of a “Schumpeterian renaissance”. This “renaissance” includes “the resur-
genceofideasaboutinnovation, includingindustrialrevolutions”andthemain
results “have enriched evolutionary theory in economics.” Freeman especially
based his conclusion on contributions to the analysis of the long-term economic
ﬂuctuations that are still often called Kondratieff waves. This analysis focusses
on the interrelations between technological change, institutional change, tran-
sition periods, and crises. The examples he provided included the works of
Perez (2002) and Freeman and Louçã (2001); and we may add the millennial
perspective on historical statistics (Maddison, 2003) and the thinking of eco-
nomic transitions in terms of general purpose technologies (Lipsey et al., 2005).
Historical studies of the mechanisms of economic evolution have to con-
front serious methodological problems. The above account has hinted as sev-
eral of them. Let us consider one of the problems more carefully—the problem
of counterfactual statements. We have already met counterfactual speculation
in relation to the question ‘what would Schumpeter have done with his paper
on the historical approach if he had not died in January 1950?’ This specula-
tion could have continued by trying to answer the question ‘what would have
happened to the historical analysis of the mechanisms of evolution if Schumpe-
ter had improved his paper?’ The answers to such questions are based on the
production of counterfactual history. Since these virtual histories are not based
on solid theory, we quickly move into a quagmire of speculation. Neverthe-
less, the historical analysis of economic evolution actually involves the produc-
tion of counterfactual histories. The more general need for counterfactuals was
recognised by Max Weber. Weber (1906, 275) emphasised that “judgements of2. Starting from evolutionary economic history 12
possibility” is an essential aspect of the writing of history. He argued that this
type of evaluation is used to advance knowledge “[i]n every line of every his-
torical work, and indeed in every selection of archival and source materials for
publication”. Let us, however, concentrate on the role of counterfactual history
in the study of the process of railroadization and its consequences. Robert Fo-
gel (1964) famously tried to answer the question: what would have happened
to the GDP of the United States if the railway innovation had failed to take off
around 1830? To answer this question, Fogel reconstructed the situation in 1890
so that it was without railways; in other words, he produced a virtual history
that can be compared with the actual history. The comparison of the two his-
tories led to the conclusion that economic historians had overrated the role of
railways as an engine of economic growth. Jon Elster (1978, Ch. 6) has stud-
ied the logic of Fogel’s procedure. Elster (p. 204) argued that, by taking the
analytical starting point in 1830, “one could legitimately assume a branching
point without railroads”. However, Fogel used the naive procedure of remov-
ing from the actual 1890 economy all features directly linked to the railways.
Although this procedure makes comparison relatively easy, it fails to cover the
inﬂuences of the railways during the process of railroadization. This issue has
been treated generally by Robin Cowan and Dominique Foray (2002) in their
paper on the role of counterfactuals in evolutionary economics.
Cowan and Foray (2002, 548) accepted Elster’s interpretation of counterfac-
tuals as relating to a branching view of history. According to this view, history
is comparable with the depiction of decisions by means of a decision tree. Each
decision is represented by a branching of the tree; and the higher we move up
in the tree, the more branches we ﬁnd. Actual history can be compared with the
movement in the decision tree from the root and upwards. At each branching
point, actual history has followed one of the branches; and we end in a particu-
lar branch at the top of the tree. History could instead have followed other tra-
jectories in its upward movement in the tree. Even remotely realistic versions
of the tree of potential histories have to include a huge number of alternatives.
Since previous historical events cannot be undone, history is irreversible and
irrevocable. It represents a huge number of “decisions” at different branching
points. In contrast, Fogel’s study of the role of the railways was based on the
assumptions that American economic history branched in 1830 and that the
consequence of this branching could be studied by removing railways from the
economic system of 1890. Cowan and Foray (2002, 550) emphasised that “to
ask what would be the effect on GDP if railroads did not exist in 1890 is not to
ask about the world in the instance that railroads were vaporised on the ﬁrst of
January 1890”. The problem is that “some of the remaining physical and insti-
tutional structures would be historically incongruous”. Therefore, we cannot
avoid the detailed reconstruction of virtual histories without railways. To re-
duce the number of relevant virtual histories to a manageable level, we need to
assume that the movement upwards in the tree is constrained and that we have
theoretical knowledge about the constraints. However, a “central tenet of Evo-
lutionary Economics ... is that there are many sources of indeterminacy in any
economy” (p. 552). These sources of indeterminacy include details about the
interacting agents, the process of learning, and the timing and characteristics
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tree of alternative histories is underdetermined and has to be complemented
by actual historical information. Thereby, the theoretical link between one state
of the economy and a later state is weakened. Nevertheless, evolutionary eco-
nomic theory does help the reconstruction of evolutionary economic history
since it does specify some of the relatively loose constraints on the historical
process. This description of the analytical situation explains why Cowan and
Foray were sceptical about the applicability of comparative statics as an ana-
lytical tool. The problem is that the evolutionary process between the initial
and the ﬁnal state does not produce a unique outcome. This means that evolu-
tionary “theory does not tell us what will happen, it only restricts us to a set of
possibilities” (p. 553).
Cowan and Foray’s paper seems to formulate a very general framework
that is close to Schumpeter’s way of thinking about economic evolution. This
framework suggests many areas of collaboration between evolutionary eco-
nomic theorists and evolutionary economic historians. The results produced
by this alliance cannot be expected to be directly comparable to the type of
“new economic history” that emerged from the work of Robert Fogel and other
historiansinspiredbyequilibriumeconomicsandbyrelativelysimplequantita-
tive methods. However, as demonstrated evolutionary economic statistics, the
evolutionary complement does not have to be dominated by qualitative reason-
ing. Moreover, the collaboration cannot be expected to be asymmetrical in the
sense of a stream of ideas from theorists to historians. On the contrary, evolu-
tionary theorists seriously need to be confronted with new historical facts that
can enforce them to improve the analytical toolbox of evolutionary economics.
This work might return cautiously to Schumpeter’s “magniﬁcent dynamics”
of capitalist economic evolution in terms of “Kondratieff waves”. Presently, it
nevertheless seems to be Schumpeter’s type of detailed historical case studies
of the major mechanisms of economic evolution that are most crucial for the
further development of evolutionary economics.
3. Evolutionary economic theorising by mechanisms
Since Schumpeter’s readers were not used to think in terms of evolutionary
mechanisms, he used his great writing skills in an attempt to force them to see
the evolutionary process that he tried to depict. He thus coined and increas-
ingly used the expression of “the capitalist engine”. He especially used this
expression throughout Part II of Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. Like sev-
eral of the other expressions he coined (not least “creative destruction”), it has
a powerful inﬂuence on the reader’s imagination. The metaphor of the cap-
italist engine depicts the economic system of capitalism as a strange engine.
The fuel of this internal-combustion engine is provided by Schumpeterian en-
trepreneurs. Their innovations “locate the ignition of the process” (Schumpeter,
1939, 102), and this process includes responses in the form of imitation, adap-
tation, and destruction. The result of the working of the capitalist engine is
“economic evolution”. We have already considered the historical results of the
workingofthecapitalistengineinrelationtoFigure3onpage8. Thebasicthing
to remember is that we are facing a stylised economic history that can largely3. Evolutionary economic theorising by mechanisms 14
... Σ0 Δ1 Σ1 Δ2 ...
σ0 δ1 σ1 δ2 σ2
Figure 4: The historical dynamics of the capitalist engine
Σ state Δ state
Mechanism of innovation (δ)
Mechanism of adaptation (σ)
Figure 5: The abstract “capitalist engine” with a two-stroke cycle
be summarised by a sequence of Σ states. Since these states are equilibrated
in an evolutionary sense, the writing of the history of the economic system has
to be made in terms of the δ mechanism and the σ mechanism. This story is
depicted by Figure 4. Here Σ states are characterised by a double circle while
∆ states are characterised by a single circle. This pictorial part of the notation
simple emphasises that the evolutionary process can stop in any Σ state while
a disequilibrated ∆ state cannot serve as the terminal state of the process.
It seems clear that Schumpeter conjured the image of a two-stroke engine in
whichthemechanismsofinnovationandadaptationworksequentially. Thecy-
cle of this engine starts from a stationary circular ﬂow. The fuel for the propul-
sive δ stroke is provided by innovations while no further energy is needed for
the reactive σ stroke that brings the engine back to an adapted circular ﬂow.
Figure 5’s speciﬁcation of the two-stroke cycle in terms of two mechanisms
emphasises that Schumpeter was focussing on the transformation of the eco-
nomic system as a whole. This becomes especially clear when we try to use his
metaphor to characterise the waveform evolution that he thought is underly-
ing business cycles. The propulsive stroke can be identiﬁed as an innovation-
induced ‘upswing’ and the reactive stroke as ‘downswing” that performs the
process of adaptation, which has become necessary because of the innovations
of the upswing. The idle state of the circular ﬂow can be called the Σ state of
the capitalist engine while the maximally disequilibrated state produced by the
upswing is the ∆ state. It is not difﬁcult to recognise that a capitalist society
whose economic life is dominated by the workings of such an engine is char-
acterised by serious socio-political conﬂict. Most of its members would prefer
that the engine stayed near the ∆ state or that the difﬁculties of the selective
and adaptive return to the Σ state could be avoided. However, attempts to ful-
ﬁl these preferences would hinder the working of the capitalist engine and the
result would be that the system does not move through a series of different Σ
states but stays in a once-and-for-all given Σ state.
Since the Sigma states are qualitatively different, they cannot be satisfacto-
rily compared by any measure of economic growth. Nevertheless, the two evo-3. Evolutionary economic theorising by mechanisms 15
lutionary mechanisms that bring the capitalist engine from one idle state to the
next one have characteristics that produce ‘progress’ in a very loose sense. The
mechanism of innovation (the δ mechanism) presupposes that entrepreneurial
projects have characteristics that in some sense are better than some of the rou-
tines of the previous circular ﬂow. Furthermore, the mechanism of adaptation
(the σ mechanism) also secures some degree of localised ‘progress’. However,
the question whether the result of overall change is an improvement is an em-
pirical one that does not allow any easy social consensus or any clear-cut wel-
fare theory in the style of Pareto. Nevertheless, it is, without any value judge-
ment, possible to describe the efﬁciency with which the two mechanisms are
working. The mechanism of innovation is inﬂuenced by the ﬁnancial and social
conditions for the Schumpeterian entrepreneurs; and the mechanism of adap-
tation is inﬂuenced by the combined functioning of the markets for products,
labour, and ﬁnance.
A related question is whether and how the two evolutionary mechanisms
are changing over time. This question has often been addressed in terms of eco-
nomic policy, but Schumpeter’s question was rather whether the mechanisms
of the capitalist engine are changing by themselves. A similar question on the
evolution of the evolutionary mechanisms has been addressed in evolution-
ary biology under the heading “the major transitions in evolution” (Maynard
Smith and Szathmáry, 1997). In Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Schumpe-
ter actually suggested that such a transition had taken place within capitalist
economic evolution. His semi-formal analysis of economic evolution had hith-
erto assumed that innovations are carried out by creating of new ﬁrms and
that the resulting proﬁts are competed away by “perfect competition” in a very
loose sense. Now he emphasised the historical transition from “the capitalism
of perfect competition” to “big-business capitalism” (p. 107). Furthermore, this
transition did not lead to the result expected by most economists. On the con-
trary, they had to recognise the “shocking” possibility “that big business may
have had more to do with creating that standard of life than with keeping it
down” (p. 82). Actually, he argued that the innovative activities of large ﬁrms
imply a speeding up of evolutionary change.
The emergence of a new mechanism of innovation suggests the existence
of two brands of the capitalist engine. The innovative mechanism of Mark I
is based on the establishment of new ﬁrms by innovative entrepreneurs (see
Figure 6a). In contrast, Mark II is based on the innovative activities of incum-
bent ﬁrms in their oligopolistic competition (see Figure 6b). Schumpeter seems
to have been aware of the existence of the capitalist engine Mark II from the
very beginning of his academic work. Nevertheless, he nearly exclusively de-
veloped his analytical work in terms of Mark I. One of the reasons seems to
be that it is very difﬁcult, and maybe impossible, to deﬁne a plausible Σ state
for the Mark II engine. Without such a state he probably felt that he would
have to discard the type of evolutionary theorising that is found in The Theory
of Economic Development and Business Cycles. Instead of a two-stroke engine, he
would have to think in terms of mechanisms innovation and adaptation that
incessantly work in parallel. This possibility suggests a much looser metaphor
of the capitalist engine.
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(b) The core mechanism of Schumpeter’s Mark II model
Figure 6: Innovative ﬁrms in Schumpeter’s Mark I and Mark II models
since Schumpeter died. Nevertheless, it is still possible to consider his mech-
anisms of innovation and adaptation as relevant for the construction of satis-
factory evolutionary explanations. For instance, we may still follow Schumpe-
ter in explaining the predominance of railway transportation at the end of the
nineteenth century by means of the basic mechanisms of the capitalist engine.
However, modern evolutionary theorists need to translate and interpret these
mechanisms. The major problem is apparently related to Schumpeter’s Mark I
model. This model was originally developed to implement his dualistic vision
of economic evolution as the outcome of two opposing forces: the force of the
minority of innovators and the force of the majority of people with adaptive
behaviour. According to Ulrich Witt (2008), the Schumpeterian idea that the
minority transforms the behaviour of the majority can best be described by the
terms novelty, emergence, and dissemination. However, Witt’s way of concep-
tualising economic evolution is not constrained to the implementation of the
dualistic interpretation of economic evolution. On the contrary, it seems pos-
sible to abandon Schumpeter’s strange dualism without loosing his major re-
sults. His Mark II model points in this direction by locating both conservatism
and innovation within incumbent ﬁrms. Furthermore, the Mark I model can
be reinterpreted in a similar vein. In any case, evolutionary economic theorists
tend to assume that the difﬁculties are resolvable. Moreover, many of them do
not apply the terms novelty, emergence, and dissemination. They instead op-














Figure 7: A version of the basic mechanisms of evolutionary processes
preservation, and selection of routines. This tendency was overemphasised by
Andersen (1994, 14, emphasis removed), who apparently only admitted expla-
nation by the generalised mechanisms of natural selection:
“An evolutionary-economic explanation is an explanation of a fact
of economic life by reference to previous facts as well as to a causal
link which (immediately or in reconstructed form) may be shown
to include (1) a mechanism of preservation and transmission, (2)
a mechanism of variety-creation, (3) a mechanism of selection, and
which includes or may be enhanced by introducing (4) a mechanism
of segregation between different ‘populations’.”
Since this deﬁnition does not cover evolutionary economic explanation in
general, its ﬁrst words ought to have been: ‘a particular type evolutionary-
economic explanation’. This change also serves to emphasise the open-ended
nature of evolutionary economic theory. Nevertheless, the improvement of
theoretical work sometimes requires that particular approaches are developed
one-sidedly while their later uniﬁcation seem to require a formal study of evo-
lutionary dynamics that cannot be discussed in the present book (Nowak, 2006;
Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998). Furthermore, the above deﬁnition points at
the practice of important research traditions that have emerged in relation to
the modern modelling of Schumpeterian competition and Schumpeterian eco-
nomic growth (including the tradition derived from Nelson and Winter, 1982).
Finally, a discussion of the deﬁnition can serve to exemplify how a set of evolu-
tionary mechanisms provides a heuristic for producing the ﬁrst approximation
to an evolutionary explanation. Actually, since we have no generally acknowl-
edged and relatively simple mechanisms of the type found in the study of bio-
logical evolution, any kind evolutionary economic explanation needs to specify
the mechanisms that are referred to. The set of abstract mechanisms provided
by a generalisation of those of neo-Darwinian biology is a well-known and of-
ten applied speciﬁcation in evolutionary economics. Therefore, we shall con-
sider these mechanisms and their interaction—as depicted by Figure 7.
When compared with Schumpeter’s general account for economic evolu-3. Evolutionary economic theorising by mechanisms 18
tion, the major difference is that Figure 7 suggests that the study of economic
evolution should begin at the level of individual populations (“industries”).
This partial analysis has to assume that the behaviour of the rest of the eco-
nomic system is determined exogenously. Furthermore, it has to assume that
the borderlines of the industry have been determined by the evolution of the
past. Under these assumptions, we can study the three basic evolutionary
mechanisms and their interaction. The mechanism of preservation and trans-
mission (inertia due to replication) secures that the routines of the individual
ﬁrms do not change over time. Furthermore, the routines can also be upheld by
establishing new ﬁrms that are clones of old ones. The mechanism of industry-
level selection leads to the differential growth of sets of ﬁrms characterised by
the same routine behaviour. Some groups of ﬁrms grow while other groups
contract. Thereby, the average behaviour of the industry changes over time.
Finally, the mechanism of innovation returns us to the level of individual ﬁrms.
Innovation can either take place through the establishment of new ﬁrms or
through the change of routine of already established ﬁrms. However, both the
mechanisms of innovation and selection are heavily inﬂuenced by exogenous
factors. The mechanism of innovation is inﬂuenced by the markets for ﬁnance
and labour. The mechanism of selection in inﬂuenced by competition from
other industries and by the general state of the economic system. For instance,
the selection pressure will be stronger during recession than during prosperity.
Schumpeter would probably have argued that this picture is even worse
than the one provided by Marshall’s partial equilibrium analysis. The reason
is that the evolving characteristics of any particular industry is likely to inﬂu-
ence its place in “the actual structure of the industrial organism” (Cycles, 143;
CyclesAbr, 119), that is, in the industrial ecosystem. However, this issue can
in principle be covered by adding a mechanism of creating new industries (see
Figure 7). This mechanism of segregation of populations of ﬁrms might be rep-
resented by the gradual differentiation of incumbent ﬁrms because repeated
inﬂuence of a small pressure to differentiate. Such a small pressure can have
powerful effects (Schelling, 1978, 147–55); but it is easier to think in terms of a
‘speciation’ event. This event is the establishment of a new industry by one or
a few innovation-based ﬁrms. This industry can be deﬁned by a relatively in-
dependent mechanism of selection. However, the industry can also be deﬁned
by its mechanisms of replication and innovation. These deﬁnitions allow us to
make partial analyses of the evolutionary processes in each of the industries.
They also allow us to analyse the ecological interaction between the two indus-
tries. In any case, by repeated speciation events we may arrive at a complex
industrial ecosystem. If we switch off innovation in all industries and assume
that the mechanism of selection has done its work in each industry, we can
study the non-evolutionary dynamics produced by the linkages between the
industries. We may also switch off the linkages and study the transformation
of the system of industries as a pure selection process. Moreover, since each of
the industries of the industrial ecosystem has its own evolutionary processes,
we can study the co-evolutionary dynamics of the system. However, this study
can easily become too complex to be handled analytically. Therefore, the anal-
ysis of bilateral processes of co-evolution is the appropriate starting point.
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note that the evolutionary mechanisms are not as easily and securely speci-
ﬁed for economic evolution as they are for the biological evolution based in
“blind” genes (Dawkins, 1991). Moreover, although the suggested mechanisms
have to some extent been adapted to the reality of economic evolution, they
might still be considered as tainted by their emergence from biological analogy.
Schumpeter was a staunch opponent of uncritical interchange between differ-
ent sciences. However, he ultimately seems to have accepted the cautious use
of “the Darwinian concepts of Struggle for Existence and Survival of the Fittest
to the facts of industrial and professional life in capitalist society” (Schumpeter,
1954, 789). Thus he did not deny that “it may be ... that certain aspects of the
individual-enterprise system are correctly described as a struggle for existence,
and that a concept of survival of the ﬁttest in this struggle can be deﬁned in a
non-tautological manner.” However, he emphasised that “these aspects would
have to be analyzed with reference to economic facts alone and no appeal to
biology would be of the slightest use”. Even Marshall (1898, 43, 39) seems to
have thought similarly since he not only suggested that “[t]he Mecca of the
economist is economic biology” but also “that analogies may help one into the
saddle, but are encumbrances on a long journey. It is well to know when to
introduce them, it is even better to know when to stop them off.” Therefore, it
should be emphasised that the presently discussed concepts of the mechanisms
of economic evolution are no longer based on analogy. They cannot be inter-
preted or supported or criticised by reference to biological evolution. Concepts
are not evaluated by their names but by their contents; and these contents have
to be evaluated in the context of evolutionary economics.
One way of coming to grips with the mechanisms of Figure 7 is to relate
them to Schumpeter’s two models of economic evolution. As mentioned re-
peatedly, his Mark I model is based on the carrying out of innovations by in-
dividual entrepreneurs who create new ﬁrms with borrowed money. In con-
trast, established ﬁrms are conservative and show much inertia. Schumpeter’s
MarkIImodelisverydifferent. Herelargecorporationsperformrepeatedinno-
vations in their oligopolistic competition; and these innovations are prepared
in their departments of research and marketing. These models have, in Part II,
been in terms of mechanisms of innovation and adaptation. The question is
howtointerpretthemintermsoftheaugmentedsetofmechanisms. Ananswer
to this question is presented in Table 1. The Mark I model explains inertia in
terms of the conservatism of established ﬁrms are conservative and their ability
to replicate ﬁxed routines; innovation only takes only place through the found-
ing of new ﬁrms by Schumpeterian entrepreneurs who need external ﬁnance.
In this setting, the creation of innovation-based ﬁrms normally leads to the de-
struction of old ones. The mechanism of segregation is also related to innova-
tion: radical innovation can lead to the creation of new industries. The Mark II
model is different. Here the mechanism of inertia is not clearly speciﬁed since
established ﬁrms have both adaptive and innovative capabilities. Nevertheless,
Schumpeter’s upholding of his concept of innovation suggests that he thought
that even the behaviour of largely ﬁrms is normally characterised by a signif-
icant degree of inertia. It is on this background that their R&D departments
engage in the preparation of innovations. Nevertheless, the selection mecha-
nism becomes more difﬁcult to handle analytically than in the Mark I model.3. Evolutionary economic theorising by mechanisms 20
Table 1: The evolutionary mechanisms and the Schumpeterian models
Mechanism Mark I model Mark II model
Inertia Incumbent ﬁrms are
upholders of routine
Incumbent ﬁrms can adapt
signiﬁcantly by metaroutines
Innovation New routines are
introduced by new ﬁrms
New routines are introduced by
incumbent ﬁrms
Selection Selection between new
and old ﬁrms
Selection between incumbent ﬁrms,
which can to some extent preempt
selection
Segregation Innovative entrepreneurs
can create new industries
Incumbent ﬁrms can establish new
industries in their attempts to avoid
competition by entering market
niches
The problem is that incumbent ﬁrms often adapt before they are selected out
of business. The mechanism of segregation is also more complex. The problem
is that each ﬁrm can operate in several markets. Some of the ﬁrm’s strategic
moves concern the location in market niches where competition is limited; and
some niche positions can lead to the creation of new industries.
An important literature on evolutionary economic theory concerns the pro-
cess of economic evolution within industries. This literature can be roughly
divided in three parts be means of the Schumpeterian models. The ﬁrst part
of the literature relates to Mark I; the second part relates to Mark II; and the
third, and smallest, part combines the two models. Let us quickly consider the
two pure cases. Nelson and Winter (1982, 49) clearly related what they called
the “Organization-Theoretic Foundations of Economic Evolutionary Theory”
to their Mark II models of economic evolution. The preliminary version of
these foundations was largely provided by Herbert Simon (1982) and by the
related work by Richard Cyert and James March (1963). However, the be-
havioural theory of ﬁrms as characterised by temporarily ﬁxed procedures and
routines was not designed to provide a description of the evolutionary mecha-
nisms of replication and innovation. This meant that Nelson and Winter had to
reinterpret the theories of routinised behaviour and its change. Thereby, they
provided a complex research agenda that included theoretical and empirical
issues. This agenda became complex because of the complexities of Mark II
models. In such models, ﬁrms are supposed to innovate and adapt. There-
fore, it is not obvious how we should specify the intra-organisational in terms
of the innovation and replication of routines. Actually this distinction can be
described in several ways. Nelson and Winter (1982, 98) started “by consider-
ing the analogue of Schumpeter’s ‘circular ﬂow’ at the level of the individual
organization.” Since they considered this system of routine unrealistic, they
turned to a series of approximations to routine-based but relatively ﬂexible be-
haviour of real ﬁrms. They also provided a theory of the routinisation of the
innovative and imitative behaviour of ﬁrms. Thereby, they provided important
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strategy (Dosi, Nelson, and Winter, 2000). Nevertheless, it is an open question
whether the organisation-theoretic foundations of evolutionary economic the-
orising have really been established (Knudsen, 2002). Especially, evolutionary
theorising seems to need more behavioural inertia than provided by the ﬂexible
reinterpretation of procedural rationality. Actually, the more general theorising
on and investigation of organisational routines might help to localise the main
sources of inertia (Becker, 2008). However, there seems to be a need of retrying
Schumpeter’s Mark I model as well as its explanation in terms of the evolution-
arily necessary architecture of complexity—as it had been suggested by Simon
(1996, Ch. 8; 2002).
While Nelson and Winter clearly related their work to the Schumpeterian
Mark II model, Schumpeter’s name is seldom mentioned in the literature that
otherwise can be seen as representing either a mix of Mark I and Mark II or
as implementing a pure Mark I model. The reason seems to be that this lit-
erature presents itself as organisation studies (covered by Aldrich and Ruef,
2006)—and that Schumpeter can hardly be said to have contributed directly to
this ﬁeld. It is, nevertheless, possible to consider organisational theoretic lit-
erature as providing contributions to evolutionary economic theory in general
and to the analysis of Mark I in particular. Let us consider the subset of this
literature that has imported its major analytical tools more or less directly from
evolutionary ecology and other parts of evolutionary biology. Core books are
Michael Hannan and John Freeman’s (1989) Organizational Ecology and Glenn
Carroll and Freeman’s (1999) Demography of Corporations and Industries. Even
the titles of these books indicate the application of tools of evolutionary biol-
ogy. Their basic question is: why are there so many different types of organ-
isations? The answer is: because of the complexity of industrial environment
(ecology). Their next question is: how do organisational forms emerge? The
answer is: through something close to Darwinian natural selection based on
heterogeneity and inertia.
The analytical procedure of organisational ecology can be described as in-
volving four steps. First, the adequacy of the tools for analysing industrial
evolution rests on the degree to which the behaviour of individual ﬁrms is
characterised by inertia. Therefore, the theoretical and empirical analysis of
behavioural inertia is a core element of the research programme; and the result
seems to be that organisational inertia is enormous with respect to some evo-
lutionarily relevant characteristics. Second, the programme has to answer why
novelty nevertheless emerges. The obvious answer is that novelty is connected
to new ﬁrms that are not simple copies of incumbent ﬁrms. This answer is
supported by theoretical and empirical arguments. Third, the question is how
incumbent ﬁrms with given characteristics are selected. Even the name of “or-
ganizational ecology” suggests that the literature gives a very rich answer to
this question. It not only studies competitive selection but also other types of
“ecological” interdependence. Moreover, it emphasises that selection pressures
in new industries are very different from those in mature industries charac-
terised by overcrowding. Fourth, the literature can turn to a large number of
concrete problems like those of classifying organisational forms in a way that
is consistent with evolutionary analysis. The simplicity of the procedures also
allows their formulation in axiomatic format (Hannan et al., 2007).3. Evolutionary economic theorising by mechanisms 22
Although the mentioned literature is called organisational ecology, it should
have become clear that it is largely presenting a variant of evolutionary eco-
nomics. Moreover, even though the simplicity of this approach has been crit-
icised strongly, simplicity is actually its main strength. First, the approach is
so simple that it is easy to detect how it relates to Schumpeter’s Mark I model
of the capitalist engine. It obviously includes no systematic application of the
Schumpeterian concepts of entrepreneurial proﬁt, credit, capital, and interest;
but it instead helps us to overcome some of the difﬁculties involved in the anal-
ysis of the complex industrial ecology. Second, the simplicity of the approach
supports the coordination of the different ﬁelds of evolutionary economics. Al-
though the approach of organisational ecology can primarily be characterised
as evolutionary economic sociology, it has also produced contributions that
have to be classiﬁed as covering evolutionary economic theory, evolutionary
economic statistics, and evolutionary economic history. Third, the approach al-
lows a quick and efﬁcient teaching of a ﬁrst approximation to evolutionary eco-
nomics. Nevertheless, the one-sided teaching of organisational ecology might
also promote the crowding from evolutionary economics of the study of the
“magniﬁcent dynamics” produced by the capitalist engine—as well as its difﬁ-
cult interaction with the evolutionary processes that takes place in other sectors
of social life. Since the approach of organisational ecology has also been used
for the analysis of the evolution of organisational forms within political life and
culturallife, thismightnotbeanecessarilyconclusion. However, becauseofthe
complexity of co-evolutionary processes, it clearly has to be complemented by
other approaches to the analysis of evolutionary process. Otherwise, we might
not even be able to understand the theory of socio-cultural evolution that the
early Schumpeter sketched in the later omitted chapter of EntwicklungI.
Since the Mark II model focusses on organisational routines rather than
on individual behaviour, it has served to de-emphasise the relationship be-
tween evolutionary economics and evolutionary biology. Peter Hammerstein
and Edward Hagen (2005, 608) have suggested that the “modern Schumpete-
rian branch of evolutionary economic theory is relevant to economics but re-
mote from biology”. In contrast, there is a “second strand” that is directly rele-
vantforbiologistsbecauseit“incorporatesbehaviouralecologyintoeconomics,
seeking to root human preferences and beliefs in human evolutionary history”.
One consequence of this approach is that bounded rationality and adaptive be-
haviour becomes ﬁrmly rooted in social and biological evolution (Gigerenzer
and Selten, 2001). Researchers in the Nelson–Winter tradition have been scep-
tical about the relevance of such a biological rooting of their theory. However,
the development of the Mark I model allows relatively easy access to a liter-
ature that, for instance, is treated by Samuel Bowles (2004) and Herbert Gin-
tis (forthcoming). This literature—which combines evolutionary game theory
with experimental economics—has hitherto emphasised the study of the evo-
lution of behaviour and institutions through the simplest possible mechanisms
and shown little direct interest in the problems raised by the evolution of the
highly complex industrial system. However, the underlying approach seems
extendible to the study of the evolution of this system through the multi-level
mechanisms of innovation, replication, selection, and segregation. Whether
time is mature for such an extension is a controversial question.4. Complementing with evolutionary economic statistics 23
The above description of some mechanisms and models of evolutionary
economic theory has largely been constrained to what Kurt Dopfer and Ja-
son Potts (2008) have called “evolutionary microeconomics” and “evolutionary
mesoeconomics”. Although these types of evolutionary analysis were crucial
for Schumpeter, his works give us the impression that he was primarily inter-
ested in “evolutionary macroeconomics”. Actually, it is only in the historical
parts of Business Cycles that we ﬁnd his explicit treatments of the microevolu-
tion in individual markets and the mesoevolution in clusters of markets. There-
fore, the present emphasis on the micro and meso levels can be considered a
reﬂection of the state of the art of modern evolutionary economics, where we
only ﬁnd sporadic attempts to develop evolutionary macroeconomics (like Fos-
ter, 1987). Nevertheless, the emphasis on microevolution and mesoevolution
can also be seen as an attempt to rescue important parts of Schumpeter’s evo-
lutionary economics from his premature attempts of overcome the difﬁculties
of evolutionary macroeconomics. Although economic life is based on money
and ﬁnance and although macroeconomic cycles and policies heavily inﬂuence
the process of industrial evolution, the inclusion of these facts presupposes a
solid understanding of microevolution and mesoevolution. This understand-
ing might be emerging; but we still have to confront explicitly many Schum-
peterian challenges. Since economic evolution is a unique process in historical
time, even evolutionary macroeconomics has to be sensitive to this process—
that even involves the evolutionary change of the basic mechanisms of the cap-
italist engine. Furthermore, evolutionary macroeconomics will have to take
into account that the functioning of the capitalist engine presupposes a certain
balance between the different mechanisms. If the mechanism of the conserva-
tion of routine predominates, the result is a stationary state of economic affairs
that cannot be described as being adapted. If the mechanism of selection pre-
dominates, an adapted stationary state emerges. If the mechanism of innova-
tion predominates, the result is chaos. It is only if the three mechanisms have
reached a certain balance that we observe an evolutionary process. Therefore, it
is important to describe the relative strengths of the evolutionary mechanisms.
4. Complementing with evolutionary economic statistics
Schumpeter emphasised that we “need statistics not only for explaining things
but also in order to know precisely what there is to explain” (Schumpeter, 1954,
14). He emphasised the importance of statistics by adding that we need to
understand “how they have been compiled” and how we “extract informa-
tion from them”. Thus we need to understand how statistical ofﬁces produce
statistics and the methods that researchers use to analyse statistics (including
“the epistemological backgrounds of these methods”). These requirements pro-
vide “a necessary (but not a sufﬁcient) condition for preventing the modern
economist from producing nonsense”.
Schumpeter formulated an important theme of History of Economic Analysis
by stating that the fundamental ﬁelds of “history, statistics, and theory ... have,
until comparatively recently, shown a lamentable tendency to travel in separate
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econometrics programme, its task is to overcome the split between theoretical
analysis and statistical analysis. Actually, he found the wished for integration
at the very beginnings of the emergence of modern statistics. Thus he praised
William Petty’s pioneering efforts in the seventieth century as “illustrating to
perfection what Econometrics is and what Econometricians are trying to do”
(Schumpeter, 1954, 209). However, this inspiring research programme “wilted
in the wooden hands of the Scottish professor [Adam Smith] and was practi-
cally lost to most economists for 250 years”. When the econometrics movement
ﬁnally emerged in the late 1920s, it needed a name. According to Schumpe-
ter, “[t]he word Econometrics is, I think, Professor Frisch’s, and it had been
coined by analogy with Biometrics, statistical biology” (p. 209). Similarly the
name Frisch chose for the journal Econometrica was suggested by the journal
Biometrika. However, while the journal of biological statistics focussed on evo-
lution, the journal of the econometrics movement ignored economic evolution.
Schumpeter tried in vain to change this situation by producing his Business
Cycles. Thefailureofthisbookwasactuallyespeciallyconspicuouswithrespect
to its application of statistics for the analysis of waveform economic evolution.
The problem is that the book’s statistical analysis is solely performed by means
of longitudinal data of aggregate variables. Schumpeter stated that his statisti-
cal analysis “reduces to analysis of time series which reﬂect economic growth
and the cyclical process of evolution as distorted by the inﬂuence of external
factors” (Schumpeter, 1939, 193–4). However, it is practically impossible to cap-
ture economic evolution by means of the statistical analysis of aggregate data
since evolution concerns the transformation of these aggregates. Therefore, the
statistical analysis of economic evolution has to rely primarily on longitudinal
microdata. Schumpeter’s unconvincing statistical performance in Business Cy-
cles reﬂects the fact that such data were practically absent in the 1930s. Many of
his statistical arguments can be interpreted as reﬂecting an attempt to specify
the dangers involved in building theories of business cycles in terms of aggre-
gates: “Such reasoning is at the bottom of much faulty analysis of business cy-
cles. It keeps analysis on the surface of things and prevents it from penetrating
into the industrial processes below, which is what really matters” (Schumpeter,
1939, 43–4). However, he spoiled this message by relying solely on aggregate
data in his attempt to date historically the evolutionary equilibria that split the
long-term process of capitalist economic evolution into separate periods.
Schumpeter’s difﬁculties serve to explain the contrasting evaluations of his
efforts by Jan Tinbergen and Ragnar Frisch. According to Tinbergen (1951, 111,
109), Schumpeterwas“tosomeextentaliento”econometricwork; he“livedan-
other life” although he expressed “warm sympathy” for econometrics. Frisch,
who in economics shared the ﬁrst Nobel Price with Tinbergen, formulated a
very different evaluation of Schumpeter. According to Frisch (1951, 89–90),
Schumpeter used econometric tools wherever possible and had an immense
“intuition” of what to model, an intuition that is “the vital part of our science
and the true criterion of an econometrician.” If we accept Frisch’s view, Schumpe-
ter’s problem was that he needed new statistical data and new statistical meth-
ods. He had already in 1908 emphasised that equilibrium economics and evo-
lutionary economics “are completely different” since “they concern not only
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peter, 1908, 182). Consequently, they also need different types of economet-
rics: “statistical methods ... must grow out of the theory of the patterns to
which they are to apply” (Schumpeter, 1939, 199). Since the term ‘economet-
rics’ has in become practically synonymous with the alliance between equilib-
rium economics and statistics, it seems inappropriate to name the complemen-
tary alliance ‘evolutionary econometrics’. Alternative names are “evolumet-
rics” (Cantner and Krüger, 2007) and “evometrics” (Andersen, 2004).
If we think in terms of evolutionary economic statistics, it is difﬁcult to read
Business Cycles without adding the statistical component that Schumpeter was
missing: evolutionarily relevant population statistics. His evolutionary model
deﬁnes a cycle as a basic evolutionary step that starts from a neighbourhood
of equilibrium characterised by routine behaviour. Then a swarm of product
innovations and process innovations disturbs the equilibrium and creates the
extra credit and demand that leads to an upswing. In the following downswing
(due to the stoppage of innovation-induced investment), there is a competition
between new and old routines; and the selected routines form the basis for a
new equilibrium. Population statistics can help to explain roughly what goes
on during such a period. In the initial equilibrium the population of ﬁrms has a
minimum level of variance with respect to the applied routines. Then the inno-
vations of the upswing increase variance and the expansion of demand slacken
the selection pressure. In contrast, the harsh selection during the downswing
reduces variance to a new minimum. Given this interpretation of Schumpeter’s
theory, it is possible to perform a partial—and admittedly naive—testing of it.
We collect statistics on different industrial populations; we measure their vari-
ance with respect to important selection criteria in the two more or less equili-
brated states as well as at the top of boom; and we check whether they behave
as expected by the Schumpeterian model of the cyclical process of economic
evolution.
We do not have to accept Schumpeter’s idea that evolutionary economics is
closely related to business cycle analysis. In any case, the clariﬁcation of many
basic issues has to start at the level of individual industries; and here we shall
presently use productivity as a proxy for an evolving variable. Moreover, the
statistical analysis of these industries do not have to chose between Schumpe-
ter’s Mark I and Mark II models. Any comparison of two censuses of a pop-
ulation of ﬁrms will have to take into account that the second census does not
contain the same ﬁrms as the ﬁrst census. Between the two points of time, there
have been mergers, spin-offs, entries, and exits. To simplify the initial anal-
ysis, mergers in the second census can be handled by also merging the ﬁrms
of the ﬁrst census statistically. Similarly, spin-offs can be statistically merged
with their mother ﬁrms. However, entries and exits are best treated separately.
The reason is not only that we thereby connect to Schumpeter’s Mark I model.
The reason is also that entry from the outside cannot be handled by the ana-
lytical framework that we shall below use to analyse the mark Mark II model.
In any case, it is not difﬁcult ﬁrst to study the part of total productivity change
that is explained by entry and exit before we turn to the study of the residual
evolution in terms of inter-ﬁrm selection and intra-ﬁrm change. Let us deﬁne
total evolution as the change of the mean value of an evolutionarily relevant
characteristic of a population of ﬁrms. Thereby, we arrive at the following sta-4. Complementing with evolutionary economic statistics 26












“Total evolution” is here the total change of the narrow evolving variable
that we have chosen to study. If we used the mean productivity of an industry
astheevolvingvariable, wemightimaginethatitispossibletoperformananal-
ysis of the aggregate total evolution of the whole economy. However, this ag-
gregate concept seems to imply a transgression of the boundaries within which
evolutionary analysis can be performed safely. That evolutionary macroeco-
nomics might be able to say something important about the change of the ag-
gregate productivity of a country is another matter—but this issue cannot be
discussed in the present book.
If we assume that the incumbent ﬁrms of the industry are extremely conser-
vative, the intra-unit change effect disappears. Then we arrive at a simpliﬁed
version of Schumpeter’s Mark I model. This model can easily be made statisti-
cally operational. If we reduce the coverage of this model to an arbitrarily de-
ﬁned industry, we recognise that it is simply a model of evolution by entry and
exit. Old ﬁrms stick to their given characteristics while new ﬁrms may either be
clones of old ones or based on innovation. Therefore, the basic statistical task
is simply to collect and analyse the vital statistics of the industry over a period
of time. For each ﬁrm, we register its time of birth and death as well as its evo-
lutionarily relevant characteristic, which is assumed to be constant within an
established ﬁrm. Then we deﬁne evolution of the industry as the change of the
average value of the chosen characteristic and study the movement of this av-
erage over time. Furthermore, we study the degree to which births and deaths
are correlated with the value of the characteristic. Finally, we check whether we
observe the typical pattern of the industry life cycle: pioneers create the indus-
try and are followed by mass entry; then a shakeout of mass exit is followed by
a period of consolidation (Klepper, 1996).
Presently, it does not matter whether or not typical patterns are observed.
The important thing is that the collection and analysis of data can follow the
rules of vital statistics in general and “corporate demography” in particular.
The latter rules have been described by Glenn Carroll and Michael Hannan
(1999). Although these researchers no not apply an explicit evolutionary frame-
work, their way of thinking seems very close to that of Schumpeter’s Mark I
model. In other words, Schumpeter’s evolutionary theory can be given a statis-
tical counterpart. This counterpart may demonstrate a need of further theoreti-
cal development. For instance, we may distinguish between entry by diversify-
ing ﬁrms and entry by new forms. We may also split the latter group according
to the prior experience of their founders: some are outsiders and some come
from ﬁrms within the industry. Empirical evidence from the automobile indus-
try demonstrates that the ﬁrms whose founders come from the leading ﬁrms
of the industry have the largest probability of survival (Klepper, 2002). This
result suggests that we should consider a revised version of the Mark I model
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to some extent inherit the characteristics of their mother ﬁrms.
Although vital statistics are important for the initial operationalisation of
the Mark I model, they are insufﬁcient for a fuller study of this version of
the capitalist engine. Furthermore, they cannot capture the capitalist engine
Mark II. Since we cannot by a priori reasoning determine which model is pre-
dominant, a mix between vital statistics and other types of statistics is neces-
sary. Thismixis, forinstance, foundinmodernstudiesofproductivitybasedon
longitudinal microdata. Actually, surveys of longitudinal productivity studies,
like that of Bartelsman and Doms (2000), look like compendia of Schumpeter-
inspired results. Moreover, it is possibly to translate the applied methods of
statistical analysis into concepts applied within evolutionary economics. Since
the concept of long-term productivity change is notoriously difﬁcult to oper-
ationalise and since productivity is at best a proxy for underlying and evolv-
ing routines, it is better to analyse the statistics of evolvable characteristics di-
rectly. Nevertheless, the problematic assumption that average productivity is
an evolving variable may help us to grasp statistical procedures that can be
used for the analysis of solid cases of evolution. This procedure can, in several
steps, be derived from Fisher’s (1999) Genetical Theory of Natural Selection from
1930. This book presented what it called “the fundamental theorem of natural
selection”. According to this “theorem”, the speed of the evolution of a charac-
teristic depends of the population’s variance with respect to the characteristics.
For example, the speed of productivity change depends on the variance of the
productivities of the ﬁrms of an industry. Since productivity change is not only
caused by the competitive selection between ﬁrms, it is obvious that this is not
a complete explanation. It is even not a full explanation in biology; and Fisher
emphasised this fact. Nevertheless, the full operationalisation of his analysis
had to await the efforts of George Price (1972b; 1972a).
Through the work of Price and his followers, it has become clear how the
mechanism of inter-unit selection can be complemented formally by a mecha-
nism of intra-unit change. The backbone of evolutionary change can be cap-
tured by two censuses of the population. At the two points of time, we for each
unit of selection resister its size and the value of its characteristic. Then we,
also for each unit, calculate the change in size and the change of the character-
istic. Finally, we are able to describe evolutionary change as being composed
of two effects. The selection effect is the covariance between the size changes
and the characteristics of the ﬁrst census. The effect of intra-unit change is
the average of the size changes of units times their changes of characteristics.
Price’s Equation demonstrates that the decomposition of evolutionary change
into these two effects is an identity. His operationalisation of selection and
intra-unit change has been surprisingly fruitful in evolutionary biology (Frank,
1998). With respect to evolutionary economics, Stanley Metcalfe (2002, 90) re-
marked that “[f]or some years now evolutionary economists have been using
the Price equation without realising it”. This statistical interpretation of evolu-
tionary change not only helps us to relate to empirical data but also to deﬁne
core concepts of evolutionary economics more precisely. A summary of the
present approach is found in Table 2. This table presents an attempt to connect
the previous section’s theoretical concepts with relatively precise statical proce-
dures. However, the motivations behind these procedures cannot be presented4. Complementing with evolutionary economic statistics 28
Table 2: Theoretical concepts of evolution and statistical procedures
Theoretical concept Statistical speciﬁcation
Evolution of a characteristic of
the industry
The change between two censuses of the
weighted average of the ﬁrm-level information
on that characteristic. The weights are the
resource shares, or the market shares, of
individual ﬁrms.
Effect of inter-unit selection The covariance between relative ﬁtnesses and
characteristics. The absolute ﬁtness of a ﬁrm is
deﬁned by the ratio of its sizes in the two
censuses. The relative ﬁtness of a ﬁrm is found
by dividing the absolute ﬁtness by the average
absolute ﬁtness of the population.
Effect of intra-unit adaptation
and incremental innovation
The average of intra-ﬁrm change weighted by
ﬁtness: we multiply the size of the change of the
characteristic of each ﬁrm by its ﬁtness; and then
we calculate the average of that measure.
Effect of exit This effect can be included in the effect of he
effect of intra-unit adaptation by setting the
ﬁtness of defunct ﬁrms to zero. The effect can
also be calculated separately.
Effect of entry by simple
imitation
This effect can be included in the effect of
inter-unit selection by merging the new ﬁrm
with the ﬁrm it copies. The effect can also be
calculated separately.
Effect of entry based on
incremental innovation
The effect normally has to be calculated
separately. However, if the entrant is a spin-off
from an incumbent ﬁrm, the two ﬁrms can be
merged statistically. The consequence is that we
increase the effect of intra-unit adaptation.
Creation of a new
characteristic of the industry
Extend the list of characteristics for which
information is collected in the next census.
Creation of a new industry by
the ﬁrst entrant
Extend the standard industrial classiﬁcation of
the next census.
quickly. Instead, they are discussed in the rest of the present section.
If we return to the case of the productivity studies, it becomes clear that
Price’s equation seems designed for the study of incumbent ﬁrms. Thus it is
primarily a tool for the operationalisation of Schumpeter’s Mark II model. It
serves to decompose the change in average productivity in the effect of the dif-
ferential growth of ﬁrms and the effect of intra-ﬁrm change. The selection effect
is measured by assuming that all ﬁrms have unchanging productivity. The co-
variance between ﬁxed productivities and size changes can be rewritten as the
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ﬁxed characteristics. The regression coefﬁcient can be called the efﬁciency of
selection. If this coefﬁcient is zero, no selection takes place and all the change
of productivity comes from intra-ﬁrm change. However, if the regression coef-
ﬁcient is positive and does not change much over time, it does not have to be
large to inﬂuence productivity signiﬁcantly in the longer run. The only thing
that is needed is that the ﬁrms actually vary with respect to productivity. If
the variance is zero, no selection can take place. This brings us to the issue
of intra-ﬁrm change. Since the data collected by the two censuses did not in-
clude information on the underlying routines of the ﬁrms, we have to stay at
the uncomfortable level of the productivities. However, we are able to deter-
mine whether the variance of the productivities have decreased or decreased.
The variance must have decreased between the two censuses if no intra-ﬁrm
change has taken place and if the regression coefﬁcient is different from zero.
The variance will ultimately also decrease if ﬁrms obtain ‘new’ productivities
by copying the routines of other ﬁrms. Therefore, the upholding or increase
of variance presupposes that some ﬁrms, by positive or negative ‘innovation’,
obtain productivities that are new in the sense that they did not exist in the ﬁrst
census.
We have above only considered the simplest issues of evolutionary eco-
nomic statistics. A few additional issues serve to remove this impression of
simplicity. First, if the ﬁrms of the industry consist of multiple plants and if the
censuses register to which ﬁrm each plant belongs, then the intra-ﬁrm change
effect can be split into an inter-plant selection effect and an inter-plant change
effect. This decomposition can be made mechanically, and the results will prob-
ably demonstrate whether the plants of a ﬁrm are sufﬁciently independent to
make the exercise analytically useful. Second, the choice of the productivity
race as the example of an evolutionary process might give a wrong impres-
sion about the selection mechanism (and the mechanisms of intra-ﬁrm change).
This impression can be removed by returning to the thinking in terms of homo-
geneous ﬁrms and by extending the set of characteristics that is registered by
the two censuses of the industry. Then it becomes clear that productivity pro-
vides us with a special example of a “ﬁtness function” (Conner and Hartl, 2004,
Ch. 6). This ﬁtness function displays positive directional selection while char-
acteristics of ﬁrms are subject to negative directional selection. Moreover, the
emergence of a standard represents stabilising selection while the segregation
of an industry into two industries is sometimes the outcome of disruptive se-
lection within the originally uniﬁed industry. Third, the analysis of multiple
characteristics will also reveal that some of them are correlated. Thereby, trade-
off problems emerge; and different industries seem to have evolved into differ-
ent solutions to such problems. The three mentioned problems might sufﬁce
to demonstrate the toolbox of evolutionary economics needs to be extended by
new statistical methods and new theoretical concepts; but we cannot stop here.
We also have to consider how evolutionary economics can move beyond the
limits of a given population of ﬁrms.
We have considered a statistical analysis of the evolutionary process within
a single industry. The selection effect has been treated with some care; and
we have also obtained an impression of the adaptive and innovative processes
that take place within individual ﬁrms. However, we have ignored two cru-5. Final remarks 30
cial mechanisms: the mechanism of segregation and the mechanism of replica-
tion. It is mechanism of segregation that creates the industrial and economic
“ecosystem” with its complex web of interconnections. It is of crucial impor-
tance to make statistical analyses of the establishment of new industries, their
destiny in their ecological context, and the macroscopic behaviour of the “eco-
nomic organism”. However, we shall focus on the mechanism of replication. It
is important to note that we have not yet considered whether the inertia of the
routines of ﬁrms is sufﬁcient to allow for a process that can properly be called
evolutionary. The chosen example of productivity might give a false impres-
sion of ﬂexibility. Therefore, it seems better to think in terms of basic standards
or basic technologies or basic solutions to complex trade-off problems. In any
case, the statistical task is to study whether the studied characteristic shows
sufﬁcient inertia over a long period to allow an evolutionary process that is di-
rectly controlled by the inter-ﬁrm selection effect. If this is not the case, the next
and more difﬁcult task is to study the degree to which the process of intra-ﬁrm
change mimics the selection that could have taken place through inter-ﬁrm se-
lection. A large degree of ﬁrm response in accordance with the industry-level
forces of selection will produce change that can be called evolution. However,
it is also possible to think of cases in with the industry is not characterised by
evolution but rather by a process that comes close to random drift.
5. Final remarks
Although the branch of economics that deals with economic evolution has be-
come established during the last couple of decades, its aims and potentials can
most easily be understood on the background of the work of early pioneers.
Schumpeter’s contribution not only analysed capitalist economic evolution as
a process of the innovative renewal of business routines. He also explored
the idea that the development of economics requires coordinated efforts within
the “fundamental ﬁelds” of theory, history, statistics, and economic sociology.
The paper has applied this idea in an analysis of the development of the post-
Schumpeterian strand of modern evolutionary economics. The focus has been
on the characteristics and interdependencies of evolutionary history, evolution-
ary theory, and evolutionary statistics. However, the paper has largely ignored
Schumpeter’s emphasis of the importance of “vision” in scientiﬁc work. The
omission of the ﬁelds of applied evolutionary economics might be even more
serious.
It is difﬁcult to surpass Schumpeter’s grand vision of the working of the
capitalist engine and his idea of evolutionary economics as providing a com-
prehensive toolbox for analysing this engine. With respect to vision, the task is
to make explicit the alternative visions that can actually be found underneath
much of present-day research. With respect to the toolbox of evolutionary eco-
nomics, the ﬁrst task is to recognise its comprehensive nature. In 1908, Schum-
peter deﬁned evolutionary economics (“Dynamics”) as an emerging comple-
ment to equilibrium economics (“Statics”). Although he initially pointed at the
evolutionary economic theory, he became increasingly aware that a viable evo-
lutionary economics also needs to include evolutionary economic statistics andReferences 31
evolutionary economic history. The co-evolution of these three ﬁelds cannot be
taken for granted. Schumpeter provided means of coordination by his vision of
capitalist economic evolution and by his core concepts. While his basic vision
has become commonplace and we need to try out alternative visions, his mod-
els might still have a coordinating role—especially if we are able to develop
the mechanisms and structural features of Mark I, Mark II, and combinations
of them. The strategy suggested in the present paper might be called coordina-
tion by simpliﬁcation. This strategy suggests that the Mark I model still has an
important role in deﬁning related tasks of theory, statistics, and history. More-
over, Schumpeter’s Mark I model should not be abandoned too easily since
Mark II is not a single model but a huge family of models that does not neces-
sarily provide the needed coordination across research ﬁelds. Furthermore, it is
on the background of the careful study of Mark I that we can formulate difﬁcult
questions about the evolutionary mechanisms of the family of Mark II models.
Finally, the strategy of successive approximations will allow us to judge the
degree to which we have moved beyond the Schumpeterian models.
The present paper has abstained from commenting on the large number
of actual and potential ﬁelds of applied evolutionary economics. The applied
ﬁelds include evolutionary organisation science, evolutionary ﬁnance, evolu-
tionary industrial dynamics, evolutionary economic geography, evolutionary
development studies, evolutionary environmental economics, and so on. The
emergence of such applied ﬁelds clearly demonstrates that we have moved be-
yond Schumpeter’s evolutionary economics. Although these ﬁelds cannot be
called “fundamental” in Schumpeter’s sense, they are nevertheless crucial for
the viability of evolutionary economics. Schumpeter never contributed to ap-
plied economics but he remarked that “it is impossible to divorce any of the
applied ﬁelds from the fundamental ones” (Schumpeter, 1954, 24). From the
perspective of the fundamental ﬁelds, his major reason for avoiding divorce is
that “the applied ﬁelds not only apply a stock of facts and techniques that lies
ready for their use in general economics but also add to it.” Many of these ad-
ditions are of little general relevance. However, the applied ﬁelds of economics
“have repeatedly developed accumulations of facts and conceptual schemata
that should be recorded as contributions to general economic analysis”. Since
such contributions are most likely in immature areas of analysis, the alliance
between the fundamental ﬁelds and the applied ﬁelds is of special importance
for the development of evolutionary economics.
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